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Abstract 
This study tries to answer the question: can we use in the philosoph  in 
competition with the traditional mo ? A positive answer is offered by Michael Dummett. For his 
conception, the theory of meaning is the foundation of metaphysics and metaphysical reality is analogous to mathematical 
reality. Dummett's solution for meaning is one holistic and practical-inferential, having two parts: the theory of truth and the 
theory of assertive force of speech acts. Application of  in Frege's philosophy is 
proving a fertile research for the history of philosophy.   
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Usually, the philosophical historiography giv  a history of thinkers with the 
suffered influences, linkages with other thinkers, the contexts in which philosophers have written and have 
developed their theories or systems of ideas. But can we also use another method, the  without 
doing the history of thinkers? An affirmative answer to this question is given by Michael Dummett, in his famous 
book Origins of Analytical Philosophy, where he states:  
f the article from the title is intended to indicate this. This is in part because, as 
explained in chapter 1, I have tried to attend to those causal influences which appear to operate in the realm of ideas independently of who 
reads what or hears of what,  
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It is true, Michael Dummett recognizes that h s not intended to replace the 
traditional model of "history of philosophy," but also that the two models are not mutually exclusive but are 
rather complementary. 
What ar history of id  in relation t
? In terms of methodology, the situation of philosophy is much different from that of other disciplines 
because in philosophy we do not Philosophy, having no agreed methodology 
and hardly any incontrovertible triumphs, is peculiarly subject to schisms and sectarianism; but they do the 
subject only harm  [1]. In the absence of  can be great at least 
for the following reasons: 1) the history of ideas can reveal the full developments of ideas, namely that 
developments which cannot be explained by historical inquiries of the usual sort; 2) it may better reflect the 
philosophizing styles; 3) it allows debates other than the model of history of thinkers. 
Trying to describe the specifics of philosophy, Michael Dummett focuses on the following features [2]: 
philosophy has not found so far any definitive solution to any of the major philosophical problems; however, 
there is a real philosophical progress in the sense that philosophy does not discuss philosophical problems in the 
same terms philosophers of the past have; in philosophy the differences of opinion are highlighted the most; if for 
mathematicians, for example, accuracy is the starting point, for philosophers accuracy is a goal not to touch 
again; philosophers do not have certainty of the content of philosophical statements with the status of conclusions 
or of the statements that represent intermediate stages in the argument; philosophy seeks to eliminate uncertainty 
by clarifying the meaning of the used terms. 
What conclusion can be drawn from this? As the author himself confesses in this characterization of the 
situation of philosophy, you have to accept that the theory of meaning is the foundation of metaphysics, and the 
effort to demonstrate this thesis is  in Michael Dummett  an extremely philosophical 
contribution [3]. I advance the hypothesis that Michael Dummett reached this conclusion after studying Frege's 
philosophy to establish the origins of analytical philosophy. Moreover, if Dummett would have followed the 
methodol   and not  would have 
reached  have been built on the linkages of Frege and 
his predecessors  on the historical contexts in which Frege developed various studies, on the correspondence of 
those times etc. Instead, thro ,  Dummett focuses on the novelty that 
comes about wit the linguistic turn.  
1. How to identify analytical philosophy? 
, what distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its 
diverse manifestations, from other schools?  T is the belief, first, that a 
philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that 
a comprehensive [1]. Adhering to these two principles are the entire logical 
positivism, Wittgenstein in all phases of his career  philosophy, and post-
Carnapian philosophy in the United States as represented by Quine and Davidson, although there are 
considerable differences among all these authors. 
Therefore, analytical philosophy arose when . Michael Dummett is convinced 
that the first clear example in this respect is At a crucial 
point in the book, Frege raises the Kantian question, «How are numbers given to us, granted that we have no idea 
Frege [4] also emphasizes that different words mean something (have a meaning) 
only in the context of a sentence. Therefore, the problem to be solved is to clarify the meaning of a sentence 
containing a numeral [4]. In his polemics with differ  views about the nature of 
numbers, Frege [4] concludes that the number is not something physical, but also not something subjective; it has 
no representation. The number has always looked in the context of a sentence. 
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Appealing to some ideas of Leibniz, Frege shows that numbers can be applied to any entity, to God or angels, 
to men or things, movements etc. There is nothing that would not allow a number, so the number can be 
consider  [4]. Numbers are objective not as physical entities, but in the sense that they 
are recognized by all people. All recognize, for example, geometric axioms, meaning that numbers as 
mathematical entities are objective entities; the  means here the ability to communicate. What is 
subjective cannot be communicated, considered Frege  means independence 
by our sensitiveness, intuition and imagination, but not independence by reason [4]. Earth's Axis or the center of 
gravity of the Solar System are objective, continues Frege [4] to exemplify, but not "real" like the Earth or the 
Sun itself, i.e. tangible in real space. The situation with numbers is the same. Moreover, since numbers can be 
applied to anything, we can say that existence itself is analogous to numbers [4]. 
But if existence it also means that numbers can only be assigned to concepts, 
because numerical assertion is only a statement about a concept. Frege believes Spinoza was right when he 
pointed out that numbers can be applied to things only after things are brought to a common measure [4], namely 
placed under a concept, under the common measure. 
Returning now to the findings of Dummett  he tho linguis was not 
so much the detail of Frege's philosophy,  but the extrusion of thoughts from the 
 [1].  There are  Dummett [1] believes  three characteristics of Frege's philosophy which emphasize the 
:  1) the sentences from our language reflect our thinking in the sense that the 
structure of a thought should be reflected in the structure of the sentence that expresses it. This situation forces 
us, concerned with methodology, to analyze the structure of sentence and the structure of thought simultaneously. 
To analyze the structure of sentence means to talk about semantic relationships that can be established between 
the parts of a sentence; 2) the notion of sense cannot be explained only by recourse to reference, through recourse 
to the definitions that govern the use of the reference; 3) to be able to express thoughts, the sentences of a 
language need an assertive force. 
The main novelty of analytical philosophy, believe  that it eschewed the old 
questions, and replaced them by new ones relating, not to language in general, but to particular forms of linguistic 
 [1]. According to Dummett's interpretation, since the structure of sentence reflects the structure of 
thought, we can state that the semantic structure will be the foundation of logic and that the structural feature and 
the composition should be considered characteristics of analytical philosophy [5]. In the same spirit, we must 
consider that all sentences of language form a continuous scale, with mathematical sentences at one extremity, 
and observation sentences at the other (Fig.1.):  
Continuous scale of sentences 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
observation sentences            intermediate sentences           mathematical sentences 
 
Fig. 1. Continuous scale of sentences 
Typical analytical procedure is to postpone metaphysical problems until linguistic problems are satisfyingly 
resolved. All these fundamental ideas of understanding the specifics of analytical philosophy can be better 
history   In this respect 
Dummett is dissatisfied by Slug
Husserl, fails to clarify the Frege  Lotze affiliation, and fails to provide a compelling historical background. 
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Dummett agrees with some critics of Sluga, recognizing that he did not pay sufficient attention to the historical 
context. 
2.  
There are three important perspectives to approach the meaning, as characterized by Gilbert H. Harman, based 
on Frege [7]: a) the perspective that we could call  in which meaning is correlated with the evidence 
of observations and with the inference, as developed in the works of Carnap, Ayer, Lewis, Hempel, Sellars, 
 perspective, where expressions (ideas, thoughts, feelings etc.) are 
tracked according to the their ability to communicate  perspective developed especially by Morris, Stevenson, 
 perspective which aims the meaning depending on the capacity to 
perform speech acts, in the line Wittgenstein (to some extent), Austin, Nowell-Smith, Searle and others. 
How to access the meaning? On the way from thought to language, or from language to things? Whatever way 
we choose, we know that neither words, nor pictures, guarantee adequate meanings to things. One possible 
answer would be that of practical holism, on the line Wittgenstein  Dummett [8]. The meaning requires a 
holistic background, composed by procedures in a practical way (Wittgenstein), and the taking of language is a 
problem of practical knowledge (Dummett). Since for Dummett the meaning is a matter of practical knowledge, 
then his theory is an epistemological theory of meaning  a theory of comprehension [9]. We must ask, then, 
what is the sense of  theory and how can it form the foundation of metaphysics? 
In the interpretation of Fabrice Pataut, one of the best connoisseurs of Dummett's conception, in order to better 
understand the position of the Oxford philosopher we must keep in mind that his theory of meaning is composed 
of two parts [9]: a) a theory of truth that allows an inductive specification of truth conditions for linguistic 
expressions, and b) a theory of assertive force of speech acts. 
So the first step to understand what is a theory of meaning in Dummett's conception is to address the concept 
of truth. It is  is unique in its own way and is indefinable, although he also 
 by references of linguistic expressions. In this way 'is true' and 'false' can seem, 
observed Dummett, predicates that apply to sentences. At the same time, Frege asks us to distinguish in a 
meaning the sense (Sinn) and the reference (Bedeutung). Then, bearing in mind the situation of mathematics, 
from Frege's perspective we can conclude that, for example, if a mathematical theorem is considered ,  
then w  in the mathematical reality. 
Hence, in Dummett's view, we should ask ourselves what is the nature of t  Since a true 
linguistic expression must have a reference, including mathematical expressions, it means that the nature of truth 
represents a correspondence between linguistic expression and its referent, i.e. it has a semantic nature. Of 
course, generally speaking, th  can be applied to numerous linguistic expressions, including beliefs 
and psychological states, but here we are inter ,  i.e. only in those linguistic 
expressions which are sentences. In this respect, Tarski provides a model for the extension of ,  
which means to establish an extensio .  Tarski's scheme can be written as 
[10]: 
  (T)    X is true if and only if p        (1) 
 The definition of  is materially adequate if any  equiva  with 
the name of an individual sentence p  by this sentence itself  for extensional equivalence 
says of the sentences of left and right to be materially equivalent. That is, we have to interpret the schema (T) as 
p  is a true senten p  corresponds to the fact that p
 is true if and only if snow is white. 
Because the meaning is not limited to references, but has the component of sense as well [4], we should also 
have an intensional equivalence. The intension represents the sense for Frege [4]  the informational content of 
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the sentence. The intensional equivalence .
vertebrates po  are not only of extensional 
equivalence, but intensional if all expressions are of intensional equivalence 
are [10]. This means that intensional equivalence is of 
stronger logic than extensional equivalence. 
This, however, is not the place to pursue various critics and interpretations of Tarski's theory of truth. Suffice 
to recall that Tarski himself is undecided about the meaning of truth-correspondence. If you can understand 
semantics as a connection between language expressions and states of affairs referred to, when it comes to typical 
examples of semantic concepts, Tarski [10] mentions alongside the concept of truth other concepts, such as 
,  Dummett points out that we have at least two possible interpretations 
of Tarski's position: 1) either to see the schema (T) only as an equivalence thesis, 2) or to accept Davidson's 
interpretation of Tarski's theory as it concerns the notion of satisfaction of open expressions (as to satisfy a 
function, by Frege's conception). Also, stresses Dummett, we must not forget Frege's requirement that the 
explanation of meaning of a sentence is to clarify when the sentence is true and when it is false. This requirement 
is expressed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (4.063), where he shows that in order to be p
true or false, it is necessary to determine p  true, and thereby determine the 
wahr nenne, und damit bestimme ich den Sinn des Satzes) [11]. 
But, comments Dummett, explain p  is the assertion p,  which 
means we have to know what the assertion is [12]. Here we introduce the second step of Dummett's theory of 
meaning, namely the theory of the assertive force of speech acts. Dumm the notion 
of truth is not sufficient to determine the meaning of th  [12]. For this reason, some 
mathematicians (as George Polya in Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning) distinguish between demonstrative 
reasoning and plausible reasoning. Thus, the scheme 
P imply Q 
P true 
 --------------- 
 Q true       (2) 
is demonstrative reasoning, where the conclusion is contained entirely within the premises, and the truth of 
conclusion has been derived from the truth of the premises. Instead, the scheme 
P imply Q 
Q true   
------------------      
P plausible         (3) 
 
 
expresses a plausible reasoning, located at a logical level different from the first case. The conclusion of the 
plausible reasoning is comparable to a force that has direction and intensity, so in the act of assertive conclusion 
from one plausible inference we can never detach the conclusion by argument. But in relation to the premises of 
reasoning, the conclusion is perfectly plausible, perfectly oriented and reasonable.  
We have to recognize, however, that all empirical knowledge that uses induction also uses the plausible 
inference scheme. For that the notion of  as realists use it  sh
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he assertion must become the central concept for a theory of semantic competence. 
But Dummett acknowledges in his interview with Schulte that  
it is clearly extremely difficult to describe the linguistic practice of assertion. Assertion gains its central importance through its connection 
with truth. Frege said that sense is closely connected with truth; but truth is likewise connected with assertion or with judgment [...] One 
cannot know what truth and falsity are unless one knows the significance of assertoric utterances: there is otherwise no basis for 
distinguishing truth from falsity. In my view, therefore, assertion is both a much more difficult concept than question, command and the rest, 
 [1].  
And in his interview with Pataut, Dummett stresses in the same way that the notion of correct or incorrect 
assertion is more primitive than the notion of truth. Moreover, the assertion may be true or false independently of 
whether we can justify it or not, which means that the act of assertion can provide an opening to the truth. 
The consequences are very deep: accepting the act of asserting instead  implies 
the abandonment of laws of classical logic, such as the principle of bivalence or the law of disjunction. The 
principle of bivalence (BIV) can be formulated as follows:  
(BIV) Any statement is either true or false in a determined way. (4) 
This semantic principle validates or justifies the logical law of disjunction (D): 
(D)  P v non-P.  (5) 
For the classical logician -  independently of whether we can prove one or 
another of the members of disjunction. In classical logic -  must be true. 
For an intuitionist logician, as Dummett, the truth cannot be independent of assertion. Consequently, a logician 
should be able to establish a disjunctive assertion even if has no proof of truth. If we take (D) for example [9], 
1,239,567 is a prime number or 1,239,567 is not a prime number,  
intuitionist perspective, it is legitimate to assert the disjunction before fixing the value of truth. 
3. el: An answer for metaphysics problems? 
As I already mentioned, in the analytical philosophy conceived by Dummett the metaphysical queries must be 
postponed until we solve the linguistic meaning. On top of that, the metaphysical problem solving model should 
be a mathematic model. Why? Because metaphysic s reality is analogous with  reality. Frege [4] 
 objective, and it can be communicated and recognized by everyone. Gödel 
[13] ensures us that interactions with mathematics  not raising any special problems. Despite the 
remote situation of sensory experience, we have a perception of set theories and the axioms imposed as true. This 
is why Gödel [13] highlights that we do not have to believe less in this type of perception (mathematical 
intuition), as opposed to sensory perception (sensitive). 
The interesting aspect is that mathematical arguments are applied not only to mathematics  objects, but 
equally well to sensitive or any other type of objects. Gödel [13], influenced in the same way as Frege by 
Leibnitz [14], theses to 
modern logic requirements. His conversations with Wang show that the logician Gödel believed that philosophy 
could become a scientific theory where precise concepts are combined with axioms. In another train of thought, 
philosophy as exact discipline should do what Newton did for physics. Not scientific philosophy as in the Vienna 
Circle, but rather more of a philosophy which can be applied to metaphysics and theology. For Gödel [13] even 
religion can be treated as a philosophic system built from axioms, provided that rationalism be largely expanded. 
Back to Dummett, he feels that for solving metaphysical problems we have to choose between two metaphors 
(images): the Platonist one, claiming that mathematical structures are like galaxies  they just are , and the 
Constructivist one, claiming that imagination has the power of creation. But Dummett carefully points out that a 
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mathematician  activity is nothing like an astronaut  or an artist s our support in 
choosing our belief?  And how can we know when to take metaphors seriously, and how should we use their 
reflection?  In the end, as Dummet said, is Frege : our considerations can rely on the sentence  context 
or linguistic expression where the name replaces an entity. So, the pursuit methodology is: 1) choosing the right 
model of an expression of significance, and 2) deciding the ontological status of objects. 
Dummett , but not pertaining to theoretical holism of Quine (meaning is given by a 
background theory). , as in Wittgenstein  point of view  for him there is 
no background theory, but a practical manner of using procedures. Dummett is not content with Wittgenstein  
answer, considering that language practices can be wrong. In his opinion, Wittgenstein is wrong to say that 
language practices should not be proven. For Dummett, sentences are deliberate actions, powerful and with 
direction, and should be justified; therefore his holism can be called "inferential practical holism." 
Metaphysics and ontology try to answer some questions [9]: Are type X objects? Are these objects 
independent from us? Do they have clear properties? This type of questions seem mathematical as the line Plato  
Frege tries to convince us. Since numbers can be applied to any reality, metaphysical queries are similar to 
mathematical queries. But, as Plato realized, mathematical queries (and metaphysical) have a fundamental 
ambiguity [15] and share a tricky ratio with sensitivity (sensorial). For example, our sensitive perception is 
contradicting mathematical perception when it allows us to recognize as multiple what we initially recognize as 
one: 
U1 
[-------------|-------------|-------------]    
       u2   
(What is one after U1 will be multiple after u2).   (6) 
In Book VI of his dialogue, The Republic, Plato describes four types of objects which we can be represent as a 
divided line analogy [16]: 1) the images (such as shadows and reflections); 2) mundane, visible objects made by 
nature or man; 3) mathematical idealizations (triangles, circles, spheres); and 4) ideas (such as perfect goodness, 
beauty, justice). Now, suppose you take a line (EA) [17], cut it into two unequal parts to represent, in proportion, 
the world of things seen (EC) and that of things thought (CA), and then cut each part in the same proportion (at D 
and B): 
E        D              C               B                             A 
|------|------------||------------|------------------------| 
   d           c               b                         a 
The divided line allowed: a/b = c/d = (a + b)/(c + d).    (7) 
for Plato, mathematically informed reasoning (dianoia) constitutes a mode of cognition superior to sense-
mathematical queries, as we highlighted already, might have fundamental ambiguities (as metaphysical queries), 
and that is why, for Plato, mathematics should be seen as part of dialectics. Like this, mathematics is more likely 
a cognitive methodology  also how Dummett feels , a holistic knowledge manner combined with inferential-
justifying knowledge. 
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